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Abstract 
The World Anti-Doping Agency‟s (WADA) vision to promote a new moral order in sport 
and new forms of organisation and management through the World Anti Doping code 
(WADC) amount to creating a new corporate culture. WADC‟s emphasis on policy 
implementation places sport governing bodies (SGB) and managers at the heart of the 
enterprise. This represents a double challenge: (i) to the organisational culture of SGBs as 
it entails creating shared systems of meaning that are accepted, internalised, and acted on 
at every level of an organization, and (ii) to the IOC and the WADA in regard to 
universality and particularity, where the general organisational difficulty is how they are 
to operate at a global (universal) level whilst such apparently intractable differences exist 
at the particular (local) level. This paper employs Morgan‟s (1997) metaphor of 
organisations as cultures to develop an understanding of the process of endorsing a global 
anti-doping policy. It explores the enactment of the WADC using the Bulgarian 
Weightlifting Federation as a case in point. While a good level of universal approval of 
WADC has been achieved the main issue remains how to get SGBs practices in line with 
it.  
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Introduction 
“Doping is a battle which can never be won”, stated Jacques Rogge, President of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), in 2003 on a visit to in Sofia marking the 80
th
 
anniversary of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee (BOC). The IOC president did not just 
made a gloomy predicament rather he addressed the amount of outstanding work that 
needs to be done by sport organisations, educational establishments, researchers and anti-
doping enforcement agencies in this regard. This would allow developing a corporate 
anti-doping culture that would align the efforts of international agencies with those of 
national sport governing bodies and athletes themselves. 
 
The fight against doping in modern sport encompasses a number of practices and 
institutions that have evolved over the past forty years. These practices are enshrined in 
various codes and symbols and constitute an inseparable part of the culture of sport 
organisations. Studies on the culture of sport organisations are still rarity. This holds 
particularly true for studies dealing with the role of sport governing bodies (SGB) in 
creating a corporate anti-doping culture. Consistent efforts of the international and 
national sporting and political communities and ongoing media campaigns have 
transformed the drug issue from the early concerns with testing to a matter of social and 
legal responsibility. It has become a norm for SGBs to have an anti-doping policy. This, 
however, does not mean that an organisation and its members have internalised the values 
of the anti-doling code and have started to live up to its expectations. 
 
This paper sets to address a largely unexplored issue about the role of national sports 
governing bodies in interpreting and promoting an anti-doping culture that would ensure 
the success of the policies and various measures aimed at arresting these practices in 
sport. It draws on Garrett Morgan‟s (1997) notion of enactment of culture. Borrowing 
from Karl Weick, Morgan proposed that organisations enact their environments as people 
assign patterns of meaning and significance to the world in which they live. He argued 
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that “we must attempt to understand culture as an ongoing, proactive process of reality 
construction”1. This view of culture, according to Morgan, “has enormous implications 
for how we understand organisations as cultural phenomena, for it emphasises that we 
must root our understanding of organisations in the processes that produce systems of 
shared meaning”2. 
 
A similar view of sport organisations as an enactment of shared reality urges us to 
redefine the role of sport managers and officials and presents them as reality constructors. 
Thus, they are seen as agents exercising important influence on an organisation‟s culture. 
It follows that sport organisations‟ structures, rules, policies and symbols perform an 
interpretative function, for they act as primary points of reference for the way people 
think about and make sense of the context in which they work.  
 
Morgan (1997) proposed eight such images or metaphors of organization including 
organisations as machines, organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, 
flux and transformation and as instruments of domination. While remaining conscious 
about the interplay between those eight metaphors, this paper employs the metaphor of 
sport organisations as cultures to develop an understanding of the challenges faced by the 
international sport movement in endorsing a global anti-doping policy. More specifically, 
it explores the interpretations of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) using as a case in 
point Bulgarian Weightlifting Federation (BWF), one of the leading schools in this sport 
in the world. 
 
In the words of Morgan “modern organisations are sustained by belief systems that 
emphasize the importance of rationality, and their legitimacy in the public eye usually 
depends on their ability to demonstrate rationality and objectivity in action”3. This is 
what SGBs are trying to demonstrate when signing up to the WADC. They do that for 
two main reasons: first, because they are genuinely concerned about the integrity of sport, 
and second, because failing to do so would result in public disapproval, withdrawal of 
funding, and eventually suspension from national or international sport movements. As 
this paper demonstrates the practices of SGBs vary according to their belief systems, 
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history and traditions in certain sports. The culture metaphor offers four major strengths 
as it: (i) directs attention to the symbolic significance of almost every aspect of 
organisational life; (ii) shows how organisation ultimately rests in shared systems of 
meaning, hence in the actions and interpretative schemes that create and recreate 
meaning; (iii) encourages us to recognise that the relations between an organisation and 
its environment are also socially constructed; and (iv) makes contribution to our 
understanding of organisational change
4. Employing a culture metaphor to study SBGs‟ 
interpretations of anti-doping policy help us better understand some of the major 
challenges in implementing the WADC. These four metaphors will be examined in turn 
but before we do that it is important first to go beyond the moral debate about the World 
Anti-Doping Code and to consider it as an organisational context and as an instrument of 
cultural change. 
 
The organisational context of doping and its enactment by Sport Governing Bodies 
Modern sports are highly organised, specialised, bureaucratic, competitive and record 
oriented enterprises (Gutmann, 1978)
5
. There is no such thing as an independent, 
versatile, all powerful athlete. The process of becoming an elite athlete involves skilful 
coordination of the work of various organisations including clubs, sport governing bodies 
at national and international levels, medical, research and technical agencies. This is an 
organisational process that in most instances requires full-time professional management. 
Crucial in this process is the role of SGB at national level. They are responsible for 
administrating all aspects of different sports in various countries, for representing them 
internationally, but even more importantly, for promoting sound practices that represent 
the sites where anti-doping dispositions could be created. A number of high-profile 
enquiries into the use of doping in sport such as the Dubin (Canada), Black (Australia), 
Coni and Jacobs (Britain) have criticised SGBs for failing to create those dispositions that 
led to the spread of doping. In a response to the attack on the IOC by the Dubin Report 
Michelle Verdier, the press spokeswoman for the IOC echoed clearly this view: “without 
the IOC the Ben Johnson affair in Seoul would never have come to light. It was the first 
body to take the problem of drugs in sport, and remember, the IOC only runs the Games 
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for a fortnight every four years. Who has the control of the competitors for the rest of the 
time?
6” 
 
The above situation, however, presents the IOC and the World Anti Doping Agency 
(WADA) with a problem in regard to universality and particularity. The general 
organisational difficulty in both cases is how they are to operate at a global (universal) 
level whilst such apparently intractable differences exist at the particular (local) level. 
Borrowing from Tayeb‟s (1994)7 insightful distinction between etics (universals as 
viewed from afar) and emics (locally meaningful elements) aspects of organisations, it 
could be suggested that the World Anti Doping Code would be the etics, whereas the way 
these are interpreted by SBGs would be the emics of anti-doping culture. Sports on the 
Olympic programme can be seen as universal in that they enjoy world-wide popularity 
and all participants play them according to the same rules. But the cultural meaning of 
each sport and the interpretation of its rules varies between countries. When taken out of 
their cultural context even legal matters pail into insignificance. Olympism, as indeed, the 
World Anti Doping Code seek to be universal in their values of respect, solidarity, fair 
play, multiculturalism, etc. These are a quite specific set of values, which, as Parry 
(2003)
8
  argued, also require differential interpretation in different cultures, i.e. stated in 
general terms whilst interpreted in the particular. In his view there would be different 
conceptions of Olympism, which will interpret the general concept in such a way as to 
bring it to real life in a particular context. Since the WADC represents a set of universal 
Olympic values it follows that different cultures will approach it and prioritise its 
implementation differently. William Morgan critical remark in this volume, that the 
current anti-doping strategy (emics) of the US Anti Doping Agency undermines the 
moral principles of fair play (etics) illustrates the point. 
 
Therefore, our understanding of the nature of doping in sport will inform our 
interpretations of the rules that govern its policies of deterrence and prevention. As 
Morgan maintained “the point is that the norms operating in different situations have to 
be invoked and defined in the light of our understanding of the context. We implicitly 
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make many decisions and assumptions about a situation before any norm or rule is 
applied”9. 
 
Houlihan (1999) documented the evolution of the anti-doping policy and the role of the 
Council of Europe, the IOC and international sport organisations. He identified five 
policy focuses pertinent to the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and the 1990s respectively. Two 
important interrelated strands of the policy focus that emerged only recently concern “the 
steady shift from the athlete to the athlete‟s entourage and the increasingly common 
debate as to weather the athlete was best seen as the villain, victim or co-conspirator”… 
and “the degree to which the domestic governing body should be held responsible for the 
drug abuse of its member” 10. 
 
The shift of focus of world anti-doping policy from athletes to organisations marks an 
important cultural orientation, which recognises the mutually constructive relation 
between the individual and the group, and further reinforces the organisational context of 
the issue. This is because a similar concern about the role of the collective begs the 
question of what SGBs (the collective) have done do help their individual members (the 
athletes and officials) develop the appropriate attitudes needed to nurture an anti-doping 
culture. The role of SGBs is not confined to establishing rules but also to promoting 
education that helps athletes acquire the right dispositions. As Girginov and Parry (2005) 
observed “it is by participating in a practice (and by practising its skills and procedures) 
that one begins to understand its standards and excellences, and the virtues required for 
successful participation”11.  
 
The individual-group dichotomy reflects a fundamental cultural value tension that 
underpins the behaviours of members of different cultures. Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars‟ Dilemma theory (1993)12 provides a stimulating account on the nature of 
this management dilemma and a strategy for its resolution. For example, if we believe 
that the resourceful individual comes before society, then our thinking and behaviour are 
likely to run thus: „concentrate on your own interest and you will automatically serve 
your members and society better, which in turn will let you concentrate on your 
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interests‟, and the circle is complete.  Conversely, if we put society first, our thinking and 
behaviour are likely to follow the opposite logic „serve your members and society to the 
best of your ability and you will automatically achieve your own personal goals, which in 
turn will let you serve the society‟ (cf. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993), and the 
circle again is complete. Either way of approaching management will have a profound 
effect on how an organisation is run, its time horizon, how its performance is measured or 
its people rewarded. Hence, the individual will try to use the collective to achieve greater 
personal success. In contrast, the group will try to promote a social discourse that 
nurtures a collective spirit shared by its members. This circular type of thinking about 
culture is different from Hofstede‟s (1980)13 linear view which sees it as opposites on a 
bipolar axe. The role of cultural values in making management decisions has been 
discussed by a number of commentators (Hickson and Pugh 1995
14
, Morden, 1999
15
, 
Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 2000
16
). In a rare study Girginov, Papadimitriou and 
D‟Amico (200517) demonstrated the link between culture and sport managers‟ 
behaviours. Considering the WADC not only as a set of rules to be followed by those 
concerned, but as an instrument for shaping the organisational context of SGBs allows to 
better understand the mutually constructive relations between athletes, managers and 
organisations 
  
The World Anti-Doping Code as an instrument of cultural change 
From an organisational point of view the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) can be seen 
as an attempt to influence the thinking and behaviours of sport governing bodies.  Its two 
main purposes “(i) to protect the Athletes‟ right to participate in doping-free sport and 
thus promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide, and (ii) to ensure 
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and 
national level with regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping”18 are akin to 
an organisation mission statement as they set out its main purpose, vision of the future 
and the outcomes it is striving to achieve. SGBs‟ mission statements provide a frame 
within which various organisational activities can happen. These are often referred to in 
organisational literature as “philosophy‟ or „set of values‟. As such the WADC, 
developed in 2003, is not qualitatively different from a number of fashionable managerial 
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initiatives currently in operation in different countries (e.g. public-voluntary-private 
partnerships in sports development, benchmarking, Quest, or market orientation) aiming 
at improving the performance of SBGs. Its implicit aims are to create a kind of „cultural 
revolution‟, to use Morgan‟s expression, which would replace the old way of 
organisational thinking about doping and put the well-being of the athlete and the 
integrity of sport as top priorities. It is not a coincidence that the word „Athlete‟ appears 
in capital letter in WADC‟s declared purposes.  
 
It took the international sporting and political community nearly forty years to arrive at 
this understanding of a doping policy, which in Europe has undergone a qualitative 
transformation from a charter to a governmental convention
19
. The emphasis of the 
WADC is on policy implementation, which places managers and SGBs at the heart of the 
enterprise. WADC‟s aspirations to create a new moral order in elite sport or new forms of 
organisation and management amount to creating a new corporate culture. Conceptually 
it builds on the notion of Olympism as universal philosophy, while empirically on the 
findings of a number of enquiries into doping in various countries suggesting the 
existence of a widespread drug culture. The figures speak for themselves – 25% of the 
1988 Australian Olympic track and field squad had taken, or were taking performance 
enhancing drugs
20
; 83,000 Canadian children between the ages of 11 and 18 had used 
anabolic steroids and that anabolic steroids are now the third most popular drug offered to 
children in the UK
21
. 
 
WADC‟s aspirations represent also a challenge to the organisational culture of SGBs and 
governments alike around the world because they involve the creation of shared systems 
of meaning that are accepted, internalised, and acted on at every level of an organization. 
It is worth reminding ourselves that 70 percent of the firms that set off on this new path 
of cultural change were unsuccessful, largely because they failed to replace the 
bureaucratic logic governing the old mode of operation
22
. Earlier Morgan warned that 
“mission statements may be important, but certainly are not sufficient to “get people on 
the same wavelength”, and that “it is one thing for top management to develop a sense of 
vision. It is quite another to communicate that vision in an accountable manner so that the 
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vision becomes a reality”23. A number of studies provide support for this view: Smith 
(2003)
24
 demonstrated for various sectors in North America that only 19% of the culture 
efforts were rated as breakthrough; Troy (1994)
25
 found 32% change in a group of 166 
North American and European companies, while Carr et al (1996)
26
 10% and Collins 
(1997)
27
 for the field of leisure services in England. 
 
It should be noted that while the members of a particular group or SBG share similar 
cultural values, it would appear that a manager‟s position in an organisation has an 
impact on how they approach and interpret particular policies. Moreover, organisational 
culture is a pluralistic concept which, as Martin (1992) argued, involves three competing 
perspectives of integration, differentiation and fragmentation that are always 
simultaneously present in organisations. Each represents a particular managerial horizon, 
where the integrative perspective concentrates on organisation-wide consistency, the 
differentiation perspective focuses on dichotomous subcultural conflicts, and the 
fragmentation perspective views organisations as fluid and characterised by ambiguity, 
complexity and a multiplicity of interpretations. In Martin‟s view the key point is that 
these three perspectives are not just an intellectual position. Rather, they have political 
implications because, for example, a concentration on the integration perspective means 
ignoring the ambiguities and complexity of real life as experienced by managers at lower 
levels of an organisational hierarchy. Harris and Ogbonna (1998) provided empirical 
evidence for Martin‟s (1992) claim that the nature of hierarchical position shapes and 
conditions organisational members‟ perspectives on culture.  
 
It would be possible therefore, to expect that similar issues would emerge in the 
formulation and implementation of the WADC. While the WADA is interested in 
achieving harmonisation of its policy across all SGBs, (i.e. integrative perspective), 
SGBs would be concerned with the interpretation of the code in a particular cultural 
context (i.e. differentiation perspective), and coaches and athletes would emphasise the 
importance of reality of dealing with doping as experienced on a daily basis (a 
fragmented perspective). This perspective is consistent with the construction of the roles 
and responsibilities of international and national SGBs, where both the IOC and IWF 
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(The International Weightlifting Federation) have the right to withhold funding to and 
sanction membership of national SGBs who are not in compliance with the WADC. Yet 
the ultimate responsibility for drug violation, or the so-called strict liability principle, 
stipulates that athletes have to be solely and legally responsible for what they consume. 
The next four sections deal with four strengths of culture metaphor identified earlier 
using the Bulgarian Weightlifting Federation (BWF) as a case in point. 
 
The symbolic significance of organisational life 
This aspect of culture metaphor focuses on the human side of the organisation. It may 
include elements of a SGB‟s life such as its structure, hierarchy, organisational routines 
and rules. The BWF was established in 1963 and has soon laid down the foundations of 
what would become a world-leading model of excellence. At the heart of this model of 
elite athletes‟ development was the idea of a systematic work of high intensity and 
volume including three training sessions a day. A typical working day of a weightlifter 
would start at 8.00 am finishing after midnight with an average amount of weights lifted 
between 30-40 tones. Pivotal to this model was a national team and those who got 
selected would follow this routine for eleven months a year with some four weeks off 
training and competition. The success of the national team, therefore become crucial for 
the well-being of the BWF. This necessitated putting in place a whole structure of talent 
identification and nurturing organisationally underpinned by the tenets of the systems 
approach with its preoccupation with the wellbeing of the system
28
.  
 
As a result between 1956 and 1988 weightlifting established itself as the most successful 
Bulgarian sport competitively, with 24 Olympic medals including 10 titles and 561 world 
records
29
. However, the BWF set also an unenviable record of being the only SGB whose 
athletes four times have been stripped off their Olympic titles, in 1976, 1988 and 2000 
Games. They also made a precedent in the World championships in 2003 in Vancouver 
when three athletes were banned from participation before the tournament started, 
allegedly for manipulating their earlier drug tests. 
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Structurally, the management of the BWF has not changed substantially over the years 
despite recent political and economic turmoils. A 1999 decision of the BWF‟s General 
Assembly stipulated that the EB should include only experts, which makes it an exclusive 
SGB where „outsiders‟ are not welcomed. The voluntary base of the BWF has always 
been very limited numbering less than a hundred volunteers. A similar organisational 
make up ensures a great deal of consistency in views and practices and is usually 
reluctant to changes. For example, the current leadership of BWF includes former 
athletes turned national coaches and top administrators. The BWF is heavily dependent 
on government subsidies. It is the most funded SGB with shares ranging from 9% to 14% 
of the total state subsidy for all Olympic sports. Dunning and Waddington (2003) offered 
an interesting figuration for understanding the relationship between the „established‟ and 
the „outsiders‟ in drug taking in sport. In their analysis „outsiders‟, labelled as „drug-
users‟, constitute a threat to the „moral order of the established‟, the clean30. If the same 
logic is applied to the operations of the BWF, those with no weightlifting background 
should be labelled „outsiders‟, and dealing with them would always be problematic. 
 
As the first aspect of culture metaphor demonstrates, the BWF is an exclusive and self-
recruiting organisation with a well-defined hierarchy where the key positions appear to be 
those of the national coach and the two top managers, the president and the secretary 
general. Top managers inevitably come to represent their organisations, thus what they 
say and do have far-reaching effect of symbolic and practical value. It follows that 
outside views as to how the BWF should conduct its business are not seen as credible, as 
they come from non-experts, thus not taken seriously and followed up. In this type of 
organisations innovations are difficult to introduce if they are not supported by the top 
management even if the initiative comes from WADA, the ultimate authority in doping 
matters. 
 
Sport organisations as systems of shared meaning 
The second aspect of culture metaphor shows how the organisation of SGB rests in 
shared systems of meaning. This implies an emphasis on the actions and interpretative 
schemes that create and recreate meaning. It sensitises us about the importance of various 
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means of shaping organisational activity by influencing its ideologies, beliefs, norms and 
other practices guiding organised actions. As Morgan argued “since the 1980s there has 
been growing realization that the fundamental task facing the leaders and managers rests 
in creating appropriate systems of shared meaning that can mobilize the efforts of people 
in pursuit of desired aims and objectives. The two key words here are “appropriate” and 
“shared” (our italic)31. 
 
The conceptual orientation of BWF subscribes to the ideology of „narrow elitism‟, 
characterised by its preoccupation with the national team instead of the whole process of 
sports development. Key features of this ideology are its infallible drive to produce the 
best results and its close relations with state‟s official political line. Most elite sports 
systems in the world are heavily subsidised by the state but this funding, as for the BWF, 
is contingent upon the delivery of medals
32
. The constant supply of positive doping tests 
has inevitably undermined the credibility of BWF. However, it is determined to 
demonstrate that it is the best weightlifting school in the world, as a publication marking 
the over fifty years of organised weightlifting in Bulgaria maintains (Dimitrov, 2004).
33
 
 
The apparent contradiction between BWF‟s image of the best school in the world and its 
unenviable doping record could be explained with the logic of the same ideology of 
elitism. It was eloquently articulated by the former Secretary General of the BWF (1994-
2004), national coach (1992-1994) and two times Olympic champion (1972, 1976). We 
asked him what would you say to an audience of parents who would like their children to 
take up weightlifting but have concerns over your doping record to which he replied: 
“I‟ve been asked this question many times and the only possible answer I‟ve always 
given is this: the Belgians and the Swiss don‟t get caught with drugs because they don‟t 
have weightlifters. Those who get caught are the Russians, the Chinese, us and all other 
great in this sport”.  We persisted and asked him to elaborate further why that was the 
case. His answer was: “well…it is all down to the strive to be the best…. I don‟t like the 
word doping. Many people tend to think that „they lift because they take drugs‟. This is 
not true. Athletes take some stimulants, but because we (the Bulgarians, explanation 
added) are lagging well behind the advances in medicine …well, there are many cutting 
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edge drugs that are very clean but those cost hundred times more. So, because we are 
falling behind we use some dated things while the technologies are highly advanced and 
keep advancing. With all due respect, but as we also happen to know a few things, take 
the American athletes for example. How would they be able to run so incredibly - with 
scotch and lemonade? No way!
34
   
 
It would not be an unsubstantiated assumption to claim that everybody in the BWF shares 
this view. Bu it is a well-established belief that taking stimulants is an inseparable part of 
elite sport. It is seen as a game everybody plays, in which getting caught is an acceptable 
outcome though not sought and undesirable it might be. Hence, the belief becomes 
„appropriate‟ and is „shared‟ by organisational members. Compare this logic to the one 
promoted by WADC. The peculiarity of this aspect of culture metaphor is that beliefs, 
norms and social practices are self-organising and have the capacity to reproduce 
themselves, and over time become not only points of reference, but valuable resources as 
well. The BWF most precious resource has always been the „know-how‟ or the methods 
of selection and training. This explains why the national head coach was spared after the 
1988 Olympics damming drug scandal (we return to this informative incident below), 
although it was a common knowledge that he was the main culprit. Since he took over the 
national team in 1968 he has been responsible for introducing a highly centralised and 
uniform system of training for all age groups.  
 
This system epitomises a range of values, norms and practices, which were supposed to 
be shared and followed by everybody. No detours were allowed and those who dared to 
question the rules were quickly dealt with. It is a self-perpetuated system, as it was 
responsible for producing a myriad of world and Olympic champions. Those people now 
represent a valuable symbolic and tangible capital. What is more, they appear as bearers 
of a specific organisational culture as they work as coaches with the national teams of 
over 20 countries around the world. Several of those coaches have already produced 
Olympic and world champions for various countries. This, of course, does not 
automatically make them „drug-ambassadors‟. However, if we assume that they are a 
product of kinds of culture described above and have been schooled in these methods, the 
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suspicion that they would employ different means to achieve results would always linger 
large.  
 
Sport organisations and their environment 
This aspect of the culture metaphor recognizes that the relations between a SBG and its 
environment are socially constructed and that they are extensions of ourselves. As 
Morgan put it: “organisations are always attempting to achieve a form of self-referential 
closure in relation to their environments, enacting their environments as extensions of 
their own identity
35”. A similar understanding will have profound implications for SGBs‟ 
strategic management, which is also a product of cultural interpretations. Higgins and 
Mcallister (2004) argued that “one of the real keys to achieving the sought after strategic 
performance is the management of the cultural artifacts that relate to the values and 
norms pertinent to the strategic change”36. Failing to achieve this management of artifacts 
(myths, sagas, heroes, language and rituals about an organisation) results in building 
barriers to an organisation‟s interactions with its environment. 
 
Of particular relevance for our analysis are the relations between BWF and the state on 
one hand, and the BWF, the IOC and the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), 
on the other. While BWF is ideologically and financially depended on the state, it is the 
interplay between the latter three organisations that determines to a large extent the 
standing of this sport nationally and internationally. Three related incidents illustrate this 
relationship. First, at the 1976 Montreal Olympics one Bulgarian weightlifter tested 
positive and was stripped off his title. The state and the media showed no interest in the 
case. There were no hearings, investigations and punishments. This lack of reaction, 
according to the former BWF President (1985-1988, vice-president 1975-1985, and IWF 
vice-president 1984-1992), was due to two main factors related to organisational 
environment. Firstly, Bulgaria was a world champion for 1974 and it would have been 
inappropriate to use an isolated case to question the practices of this SGB. Secondly, at 
the time there was no agreement about the list of prohibited substances between the IOC 
and IWF, which created confusion for many SGBs
37.  If an organisation‟s practices are 
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not externally scrutinised and internally reviewed they would be no corrective to its own 
image. 
 
Second, at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games two Bulgarian weightlifters tested positive for 
drugs (with spuriously high dosage of phurosemid in their urine samples) and lost their 
medals. This urged the management to withdraw the team from participation half way 
through the competition. This time, the media got heavily involved and kept the story on 
the top of public agenda for several weeks. As a result, the entire BWF‟s Executive 
Board resigned. Interestingly, as mentioned, the head coach, who is widely regarded as 
„the architect of weightlifting‟, was spared. A similar interpretation of the responsibilities 
of a SGB and its members appears to be at odds with any organisational standard. 
However, it supports Morgan‟s assertion that many of the problems organisations 
encounter in dealing with their environments are intimately connected to the kind of 
identity they are trying to maintain
38. This identity reflects also BWF‟s relations with the 
IWF and the IOC. It is widely known that before the 1988 Games Bulgarian team set a 
goal of seven Olympic titles plus a win in the team competition.  
 
The IWF did not perceive that as a „healthy‟ development for the world weightlifting and 
tried to put pressure on the BWF to reconsider its target to two titles. The BWF refused to 
back down and after a hugely damaging scandal that affected the whole sport ended up 
with two titles as offered. Allegedly, after the tournament a highly-ranked IWF‟s official 
told the national team representatives “why didn‟t you listen to what we offered you, so 
we had to have all these circuses”.  We should not forget that behind the scandal there is 
the personal drama of those involved. The incident ruined the life of one of the banned 
athletes who ended up in prison for rape and assault. Denham‟s (2004)39 study on the 
enactment of drug policy in Major League Baseball provides a similar example for the 
relations between a SBG, the state and the media in an American context. He 
demonstrated how the media actively promoted a culture of no-tolerance to the lack of 
out-of-competition testing, which eventually was adopted by the MLB. 
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Third, the case of the World championships in Vancouver in 2003 where quotas for the 
2004 Athens Olympics were to be contested set a precedent in the world of weightlifting. 
A few days before the championships, without consulting the EB and any evidence, the 
president of IWF single-handedly suspended three Bulgarian athletes from participation 
not on the ground of positive tests but for manipulating their doping samples.  The 
decision triggered a spiral of mutual accusations, threats and even a physical assault on 
the IWF president by his BWF counterpart. The Bulgarian Sports Ministry stood firmly 
behind the team and threatened to sew the IWF for violating its own code of conduct. 
Shortly after that, however, it made a u-turn and offered a number of privileges to the 
athletes concerned to drop their charges against the IWF.  This kind of behaviour is 
indicative for the complexity of the relations between a SGB and its environment, and 
that these relations are constantly being constructed and negotiated. In commenting the 
case the former BWF‟s president (1985-1988) remarked: “this is number one sport in the 
country. The Ministry of Sport either feel involved in what has happened or they feel 
they‟ve been right and should fight till the end”40. 
 
Historically the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF)-BWF nexus has always 
been of particular importance. This provided three key benefits - domestic and 
international legitimacy, support and influence in the world weightlifting community. 
After 1988, however, those links have been strained due to concerns over athletes‟ 
doping record. Bulgarian weightlifters are no longer seen as a model to be emulated, but 
equally as a liability to the IWF as for the past 8 Olympic Games 7 of them including 4 
champions have been stripped of their medals for positive drug test. By the same token 
weightlifting turned a liability for the image of the Olympics, as the Soul incident led the 
then IOC vice-president Dick Pound to publicly call for dropping weightlifting from the 
Olympic programme.  
 
The IWF had to be seen of doing something and after the 2000 Sydney Games threatened 
to suspend the national team from participation in international competitions for 5 years. 
In an attempt to appease the situation in 2003 the IWF president was invited to Bulgaria 
and met by the Prime Minister and top sport officials and awarded a honorary Doctorate 
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from the National Sports Academy. The IOC Programme Commission Report to the 117 
Session of the organisation provided a thoughrogh audit of the standing of all sports and 
their contribution to the Games. The ultimate purpose of this exercise was to identify 
„vulnerable‟ sports that can be deleted from the Olympic programme. According to the 
report weightlifting doping profile of 27 (out of 5,347 tests - 0.5%) positive drug tests in 
2003 compares well with the other major drug violators such as swimming with 19 
(9,270 – 0,2%), athletics 120 (18,876 – 0,64%) and cycling 61 (12,352 – 0,49%)41.  
 
Those results by no means reflect the true picture of the drug problem in sport, but at 
least offer some comfort to the leaders of weightlifting internationally and nationally. 
They serve also as warning to SGBs that their doping image has to be carefully managed. 
In this process SGBs have to both promote their own identities and to accommodate other 
parties‟ views. By doing that they assert an important facet of organizational culture that 
links an organization‟s beliefs and ideas about who they are and what they are trying to 
do with the environment in which they operate. The problem remains that nobody ever 
explained what actually happened in the three cases discussed above and who should take 
the responsibility for what. The way the Vancouver case was framed by the media, state 
officials and the BWF itself promoted a discourse of „a world conspiracy against the best 
in the world”. For example, several statements of the sport minister made the headlines: 
“we are going to sew the International Weightlifting Federation for US$10 million”; “I 
trust unreservedly our athletes”42. This kind of discourse diverts attention away from the 
efforts to create a corporate culture, which is based on the idea of co-operation and shared 
meanings. 
 
Culture and organisational change 
The final culture metaphor contributes to our understanding of organisational change. 
This issue is central to an analysis of doping culture as it directs attention to the values 
and images that are to guide SGBs‟ actions. As Morgan maintained: “since organization 
ultimately resides in the heads of the people involved, effective organisational change 
always implies cultural change”43.   
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Different approaches addressing the need for changing the doping culture have been 
proposed, and some of them directly challenge WADA‟s mission. Dawson (2001)44 saw 
harm minimisation and education as the way forward, while Savulesku, Foddy and 
Clayton (2005)
45
 advocated for legalising performance enhancing drugs. A more 
comprehensive view is taken by Donovan et al (2002)
46
, who employed a behavioural 
science perspective to develop a conceptual framework for achieving performance 
enhancing drug compliance in sport. Despite its merits, however, the emphasis of this 
approach is on the behaviour of the athlete and largely fails to address the role of SGBs 
as custodians of the key values that form athletes‟ behaviour. 
 
It should be noted that the first three aspects of the culture metaphor are closely related to 
the notion of organisational change. We have seen that organisations develop and 
maintain an image of themselves, which they try to extend to the environment in which 
they operate. A change in doping culture implies re-evaluation of some of those 
fundamental values and beliefs on which the image is based. A series of organisational 
events following the poor performance of Bulgarian weightlifters at the 2004 Athens 
Olympic Games could be seen as a confirmation of the assertion made above that the 
main problem of the BWF is connected with the identity of the best weightlifting school 
in the world it is trying to maintain. Conscious of that the former president of the BWF 
(2000-2004), world champion (1979, 1981, 1982) and a failed top contestant for a new 
term in office publicly stated after the Games that “the architect of Bulgarian 
weightlifting has achieved successes but those were entirely due to doping and the 
chemistry”47. The words appear consistent with actions as two years earlier he fired the 
head coach. It is not clear if this statement reflects what a SGB leadership really thinks or 
it has been used as a pre-election gimmick to silence the opposition supporting the former 
head coach. This situation was used by a group of 26 clubs who got behind one of the 
victims of Vancouver 2003 and put forward his candidature for a president. He promoted 
the idea of an athlete centered SGB but failed to win. None of the contenders for the 
leadership position, however, clearly articulated what and how should be done to change 
the tarnished image of this sport and to improve its achievements. The election results 
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suggested that the BWF is going to follow a policy pretty much in line with what it has 
been doing best.  
 
The challenge of changing the doping culture is growing significantly with the rising 
number of governments and sport organisations who have signed the World Anti Doping 
Code. In 2003 ninety three governments signed the Copenhagen Declaration on doping 
which served as a blueprint for the WADC. In May 2005 there were 166 governments 
signatures to the Code and by mid August their number rose to 173. The WADC of the 
World Anti Doping Agency promotes a kind of corporate culture that rests in distinctive 
capacities or incapacities built into the attitudes and behaviours of the SGBs world wide. 
The four culture metaphors employed by this analysis helped shed a new light on this 
mutually constructive relationship. They emphasised the symbolic significance of 
organisational life, how organisations create systems of shred meaning, the construction 
of the relations between an organisation and its environment and how change occurs. As 
the case of the BWF demonstrated in order to understand the nature of the anti-doping 
environment in which it is supposed to operate it has to try to understand itself as an 
organisation. Morgan calls „egocentric‟ organizations which see themselves as discrete 
entities fighting for survival in a hostile world. They have a relatively fixed notion of who 
they are and are determined to sustain that identity at all costs.  A similar view leads a 
SGB to overemphasising its importance while neglecting the significance of the wider 
system of anti doping relations in which it exists. This system includes sports 
organisations, national governments, educational establishments, research institutions,  
individuals, and of course, international cooperation.  While a good level of agreement at 
the level of etics of doping (universal approval of WADC) has been achieved the real 
challenge to corporate anti-doping culture remains to get the emics (SGB‟s practices)  in 
line with the etics. 
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